Deprivation of liberty after AGNI

Decisions applying Re AGNI [2026] UKSC 16 to the question of whether a person is deprived of their liberty. Cases are listed newest first. Paragraph references are in square brackets.

Which decisions matter most?

Tier 1 and Tier 2 Court of Protection decisions do not set precedent. The ones to look out for are Tier 3 (High Court judges) and above, particularly where the judge has decided a point of law, given guidance as to procedures to follow, or where the issue of whether circumstances amounted to deprivation of liberty was disputed and argued rather than agreed between the parties. Family Division decisions of High Court judges sit at the same level as Tier 3. Decisions of the Northern Ireland courts are persuasive only in England and Wales. Cases that set precedent carry a Precedent badge.

We include references to unreported decisions, but we emphasise that, as faithful as bloggers seek to be in recording such decisions, blogs of unreported decisions cannot serve as a substitute for a written judgment.

Last updated 31 October 2026. Select Details on any case for the full summary, or Expand all to read every case.

13reported decisions

7deprivation of liberty

6no deprivation of liberty

9unreported decisions

Deprivation of liberty (found by the court, or not disputed) No deprivation of liberty

Reported judgments: England and Wales

Case	Date	Court	Objective element	Valid consent	Setting
DoL found A Local Authority v ZZ [2026] EWCOP 57 (T2)	29 Oct 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Burrows	Objectively deprived of liberty [21]: highly restrictive, almost every aspect of life regulated [12]; not within relative normality, largely imposed to protect the public [13]. Between Judge Tindal's categories in TW: grateful not to be somewhere more restrictive, but 'closer to that of mere acquiescence rather than actual agreement' [20]	No valid consent: compliance, acquiescence and resignation are not consent; accepts the arrangements because he sees no alternative [16], [22]	Supported living; property under a tenancy in his own name [8]
The case Nature of case Community DoL; restrictions for public protection Age of P About 22 (20 in March 2024) Mental impairment Mild learning disability, ADHD, possible OCD [6] Care arrangements Location of care Supported living; property under a tenancy in his own name [8] Care package hours 24-hour support [8] Details of restraint Not stated in the judgment Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) No key to his home; supervised in the community; communications and relationships overseen and controlled; technology and social media restricted; devices removed overnight [9], [12] Views P's views Wants his own key and more freedom in relationships, communications and daily life; compliance reflects 'acceptance of present reality' [16]. Has expressed approval of some aspects of the placement [15] Views of family/carers Not stated in the judgment Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [16] However, the evidence demonstrates that ZZ wishes to enjoy substantially greater autonomy than is presently available to him. He wishes to possess his own key and to enjoy greater freedom in his relationships, communications and daily life. What he ultimately wants, not surprisingly, is to live a more normal and independent existence. His compliance with the current arrangements reflect an acceptance of present reality rather than genuine agreement with the restrictions themselves. [20] ... He knows that he is better off where he is than in a more restricted environment, and for that he is grateful. However, it is clear he would rather have greater freedom. For that reason, his position is closer to that of mere acquiescence rather than actual agreement. [22] Moving on to the subjective element. Compliance, acquiescence and resignation should not be confused with consent. Even if ZZ possesses the ability to provide valid consent to these arrangements, for the reasons outlined above, I am not satisfied that he does in fact do so. Rather, he accepts the arrangements because he recognises that they presently exist and because he sees no alternative. That is not the same as giving genuine consent to them. The subjective element identified in NI is therefore established. Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment Anything else of particular interest Agreed order [1]. Restrictions imposed to protect the public can be in P's best interests (following Y County Council v ZZ and Birmingham CC v SR) [28]–[35]. Compares conditionally discharged restricted patients, who accept restrictions because they have no option [20]. State attribution automatic where the court approves restrictions [24]. Annual reviews directed [36].
No DoLPrecedent Re B (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWHC 2789 (Fam)	29 Oct 2026	High Court (Family Division) Henke J	No confinement: relative normality of family life with kinship carer she regards as her mother; supervision arises from a natural family relationship and enables her to go out [40], [45]	Objective and subjective elements overlap: 'B is happy and content with her lived experience' [45]. Valid consent is autonomous and applies to children; weight depends on age, maturity and understanding [24]. The local authority cannot consent to confinement of a child in its care (J v BANES still binds) [31]–[32], [36]	Kinship foster placement with extended family member C (registered, paid foster carer) under a final care order [3], [40]
The case Nature of case Child DoL (inherent jurisdiction); child under a final care order Age of P 9 Mental impairment Autism Spectrum Disorder and Global Developmental Delay [2] Care arrangements Location of care Kinship foster placement with extended family member C (registered, paid foster carer) under a final care order [3], [40] Care package hours 1:1 at all times, up to 2:1 at home, in the community, at school, respite and in transport [4], [39] Details of restraint Reins at home and if necessary in the community; car harness; locking buggy; CPI-trained school staff may use reasonable force as a last resort [4], [39] Details of medication Evening medicine mentioned in her own account; no restrictive medication described [3] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) External doors, garden gate locked; window restrictors; PIN locks on kitchen and utility room; sensor mat and motion alarm at night; community contact supervised up to 2:1 [4], [39], [40]. No meaningful contact with birth parents [3] Views P's views 'I'm really happy living with mummy C and D. I feel safe and cared for. I don't want to move — this is my home.' (EHCP, Sept 2025) [3] Views of family/carers Kinship carer C, whom B regards as her mother, provides 1:1 supervision with help from her adult son [4], [40]. Birth parents play no part in her life [3], [25] Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [24] Following AGNI, it is clear that "valid consent" for determining whether there is a deprivation of liberty is an autonomous concept, distinct from legal capacity under domestic law and consent to waive Convention rights. A person who lacks capacity to decide their living and care arrangements may nevertheless understand and accept them sufficiently to prevent those arrangements amounting to a deprivation of liberty. I consider that this applies equally to children. The question is not whether the child has legal capacity or is Gillick competent, but whether they are aware of their environment, have a basic understanding of their circumstances and can express a view. The weight given to that view will depend on the child's age, maturity and understanding. [31] ... It is the purpose of Article 5 itself, the second proposition, which goes to the heart of the reasoning in J — see paragraphs 48, 50 and 52. That reasoning holds good. To permit the State, in the form of the local authority, to consent to the confinement by the State of an individual would drive a coach and horses through the purpose of Article 5. [45] I stand back and consider B's concrete situation and the nature, cumulative effect and purpose of the restrictions. Having done so, I agree with the local authority and B's Children's Guardian that they do not amount to a deprivation of liberty. Storck (a) and (b) overlap in this case. There is no confinement. B is happy and content with her lived experience. Article 5 is not engaged; no court authorisation is required and the proceedings are dismissed. Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment Anything else of particular interest Henke J is the lead judge of the National DoL List; first of several reserved judgments [1]. Local authority and Guardian agreed there was no DoL; they disagreed only on whether J v BANES still binds [14]. Positive obligations under Articles 2 and 3 cannot justify a DoL outside Article 5(1)(a)–(f) [32]. Principles for children set out at [36]. Re A-F 'rule of thumb' framed by Cheshire West; assessment now follows AGNI [34]. Whether parents can consent for under-16s after AGNI left open [25].
DoL found NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland ICB v AA & Ors [2026] EWCOP 56 (T1)	15 Oct 2026	Tier 1 Tribunal Judge Sharron	Objectively confined [81]: high level of control over daily life [54]; daily risperidone to suppress behaviour, not to treat a core disorder [46], [54]; narrow participation in ordinary activities and life not relatively normal for him [65]–[67]; restrictions on family contact [61]	No valid consent: not sufficiently aware of his environment, arrangements or options [80]. Serious doubt whether genuinely content or objecting [79]	Supported living placement since discharge from hospital on 25 June 2025 [1]
The case Nature of case Community DoL (supported living); s.21A-type welfare proceedings Age of P 26 Mental impairment Learning disabilities, epilepsy, diabetes; non-verbal [1] Care arrangements Location of care Supported living placement since discharge from hospital on 25 June 2025 [1] Care package hours 2:1 day and night; 15-minute night checks; bed sensor [15] Details of restraint PBS restraint holds permitted (used once since April 2026); lap strap; child locks in vehicles; locked doors, windows and gates [15], [45] Details of medication Risperidone daily since 3 Oct 2025, introduced to reduce challenging and self-injurious behaviour [15], [46] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Contact agreement: 7 hours on 3 fixed days plus 1 floating day; supervised; cannot visit the family home or join family gatherings [12], [15], [61], [65]. Food locked; no access to his own money [15] Views P's views Non-verbal; mixed picture; serious doubt whether he is content or objecting to all or part of the arrangements [79], [81] Views of family/carers Parents (father represented; mother KA in person) argued he is deprived of his liberty [39]–[41]. They would ideally want him home with a care package but reluctantly accept that is not realistic; they did not oppose the best interests order [9]. ICB and Official Solicitor argued no DoL [28]–[34]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [54] It is my view, for the reasons set out above, that there is a high level of control exercised over AA, in terms of his daily life. This is a factor which weighs in favour of confinement. The administration of Risperidone, as part of this daily regime, which is not being used to treat an underlying core disorder but to suppress behaviours that challenge, is in my view also significant, both in relation to whether there is objective confinement, as well as what can be interpreted about AA's wishes and feelings from his current presentation. [82] People who lack capacity are inherently vulnerable and amongst them, those who are unable to speak, are the most vulnerable of all. Whilst I recognise that the determination the court must ultimately make is a binary one, it is important, in my view, to acknowledge those cases where there is genuine uncertainty, and it is appropriate to err on the side of caution. Article 8 protections All advocates agreed Article 8 restrictions on family contact are a factor to weigh in the Article 5 balance; the court agreed [61] Anything else of particular interest Caution about 'relative normality' for someone subject to high restriction: compare what was normal for him before hospital [66]. Erring on the side of caution where genuinely uncertain [82]. DoL authorised; review outside court before expiry [83]. Described by HHJ Burrows in Re ZZ [18] as an 'exceptionally clear Tier 1 judgment'.
No DoL Re PK & MK (Article 8 Protections) [2026] EWCOP 52 (T2)	8 Oct 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Burrows	Not met: 'some way from the paradigm'; 'as at home as could be possible'; restrictions only for safe care; 'relatively normal' [17]	Obiter: could not give valid consent [12]	Shared placement N since April 2026; previously a children's home with court-authorised DoL [13]
The case Nature of case Ending court-authorised DoL proceedings after AGNI; Article 8 safeguards Age of P 18 (twins) Mental impairment PK: autism, global developmental delay, sensory processing disorder, epilepsy; non-verbal [10]. MK: autism, learning disability/global developmental delay, sensory difficulties, gross motor delay [11] Care arrangements Location of care Shared placement N since April 2026; previously a children's home with court-authorised DoL [13] Care package hours PK: 1:1 in placement, 2:1 in community and bathing; MK materially similar [14] Details of restraint No restraint described; window restrictors, external door locks, child locks in transport [14] Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Weekly overnight stays with mother; family contact actively promoted [15]-[16] Views P's views Appear not to object; challenging behaviour is not objection to the placement; twins enjoy living together [17] Views of family/carers Mother has weekly overnight stays with both and facilitates wider family contact [15]; she may act as their advocate [39]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [17] [...] There is no doubt that the setting in which PK and MK live is some way from the paradigm place of detention identified by the Supreme Court. It is a place in which both young women are as at home as could be possible for people with their needs and disabilities. [...] The purpose of the restrictions upon them is entirely to enable them to receive care in a safe manner. It is a "relatively normal" setting for young women with their level of need. They appear not to object. [...] Above all, perhaps, they have each other. Article 8 protections Main subject of the judgment [5], [18]-[44]. OS for PK: an advocate is 'essential' [24]; OS for MK: independent scrutiny needed, citing Nikolyan v Armenia [25], [33] (rejected [34]-[36]). Care Act 2014 and MCA are adequate protections here [36], [38], applying TDB v Haringey [2026] EWCA Civ 1184 [31]-[32]. Both referred to Care Act advocacy; LA to refer back to court if advocacy does not materialise [43]-[44]. Anything else of particular interest Twins; joint judgment
No DoL Lancashire County Council v BM (Re BM) [2026] EWCOP 48 (T2)	2 Oct 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Burrows (Preston)	Not met, 'finely balanced': disability support, not confinement [40], [42]	Obiter: valid consent not established [43]-[44]	Solo residential placement; child under a care order [11], [20]
The case Nature of case Community DoL (pre-dating AGNI) Age of P 16 Mental impairment Autism; severe learning disability; very limited verbal language [14]-[15] Care arrangements Location of care Solo residential placement; child under a care order [11], [20] Care package hours Minimum 3:1, 24 hours a day [21] Details of restraint PMVA restraint as last resort (3 in 3 months); locked doors [21], [22] Details of medication Melatonin, 'not used as restraint' [21(vii)] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Weekly supported parental contact in community; no mobile phone [23], [36] Views P's views Treats placement as home; does not resist; 'derives comfort, stability and security' [26], [38]; views on restrictions unclear [27] Views of family/carers Parents are loving and committed and accept BM presently needs local authority care [5], [11]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [40] Weighing all the evidence together, and considering BM's situation as a whole, I have concluded that the arrangements do not amount to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5. I acknowledge that this is a finely balanced case. The restrictions are extensive. Their intensity would, prior to the decision in NI, have resulted in a finding of deprivation of liberty. However, the current exercise is not a mechanistic one. The restrictions must be understood in the context of BM's disabilities, the purpose they serve, the life they enable him to live, the relative normality of the arrangements for somebody with his needs and, importantly, his own experience of them. [41] I have already referred to the significant restrictions that exist. They include 3:1 staffing, continuous supervision, restrictions on his ability to leave independently, environmental controls and the possibility of restraint. Those are all matters which weigh in favour of a finding of deprivation of liberty. I also accept the force of the ALR's submission that BM is not living the life of an ordinary teenager. He is not in formal education. He has very limited peer interaction and aspects of his life are substantially controlled by others. [42] However, those features cannot be viewed in isolation. Similar levels of supervision were required within the family home before his removal into care. They would have to be present wherever BM lives. The restrictions serve a protective and enabling purpose. They are not punitive. They permit BM to live in an environment which he experiences as safe, predictable and supportive. His placement bears little resemblance to detention in any ordinary sense. Unlike ST, BM does not experience the arrangements as oppressive. Viewed as a whole, they are more accurately characterised as an intensive and highly individualised package of disability support than as confinement. Accordingly, I conclude that BM is not deprived of his liberty. […] [43] It is therefore unnecessary for me strictly to determine the issue of valid consent. However, because the issue was fully argued before me, I shall record my view. Had it been necessary to determine the point, I would not have found that valid consent had been established. In my judgment consent must retain some meaningful content. It cannot be reduced merely to contentment or compliance. I accept that a person may lack capacity under the MCA whilst nevertheless possessing sufficient practical understanding of their circumstances to consent for Article 5 purposes, as demonstrated by Mustafa. [44] However, I also accept the cautionary approach adopted in Oxfordshire where genuine uncertainty exists regarding whether apparent acceptance truly amounts to consent. In my judgment BM's evidence demonstrates contentment, attachment, trust and acceptance of his lived experience. It does not demonstrate sufficient appreciation of the restrictions themselves or of the arrangements under which he lives. In that respect I regard his circumstances as closer to Oxfordshire than Mustafa. Accordingly, had I concluded that the objective element of confinement was established, I would not have found valid consent proved. However, because I have concluded that the arrangements do not objectively amount to a deprivation of liberty, that issue does not affect the outcome of the application. Article 8 protections [45] Having made that decision [that no deprivation of liberty], there is one other issue I need to consider, namely BM's Article 8 rights. I am satisfied that BM's Article 8 rights are protected. He is a child subject to a care order. He has a social worker. There are regular meetings at the Local Authority to discuss, evaluate and modify his care plan. The Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO) remains involved in his case. In addition, he will continue to receive support under the statutory leaving-care framework. There is therefore no need for this Court to put in place any scheme of directions for the matter to be brought back before it. Anything else of particular interest Obiter on valid consent compares Oxfordshire and Mustafa: consent 'cannot be reduced merely to contentment or compliance' [43]-[44]. Hearing 15 September 2026
DoL found Essex County Council v MH & Ors (Re ST) [2026] EWHC 2328 (Fam)	10 Sep 2026	High Court (Family Division) Theis J	Not separated: up to 3:1, locked doors and windows, her objection [76]	No express finding; ST objects to the restrictions [70], [76]	Residential children's placement, out of area; Ofsted 'Inadequate' when placed [22], [25], [72]
The case Nature of case Child DoL (pre-dating AGNI); inherent jurisdiction Age of P 15 Mental impairment Developmental trauma, ADHD; repeated self-harm [1], [51] Care arrangements Location of care Residential children's placement, out of area; Ofsted 'Inadequate' when placed [22], [25], [72] Care package hours Up to 3:1 day and night; 2:1 from 6 July 2026 [62], [69] Details of restraint Physical restraint if necessary; locked doors and windows [69(c)-(d)] Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Mother and grandmother six times a year; phone limits not described [22], [49(b)] Views P's views Finds supervision 'oppressive' and objects [70], [76]; the order 'makes her want to run' [77]; absconds [61] Views of family/carers Parents are parties but their views are not recorded. The Children's Guardian supported the order [75]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [76] On any view it is clear the order sought by the local authority that include up to 3:1 supervision, locked doors and windows in the placement, and the way those restrictions are experienced by ST, which she objects to, means that she is deprived of her liberty. Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment. Anything else of particular interest Order made 7 July 2026; reasons given 10 September 2026. About her 25th placement [77]. Severe criticism of the local authority's fragmented services and the 'catch 22' over therapy and education [84]-[85]. 12-week order with a step-down plan [70], [81].
DoL found TW v Worcestershire County Council [2026] EWCOP 54 (T2)	9 Sep 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Tindal	Met, 'finely balanced': continuous supervision and control, not free to leave, restraint in care plan; acid test met but 'certainly not a sufficient condition' [71]-[74]	Clearly no valid consent: consistent objection, especially to external professionals [68]	Specialist care home under DoLS; s.117 aftercare after s.2 and s.3 MHA detention [1]-[2]
The case Nature of case s.21A challenge to a DoLS authorisation Age of P 38 Mental impairment Paranoid schizophrenia; global developmental delay; type 2 diabetes [1] Care arrangements Location of care Specialist care home under DoLS; s.117 aftercare after s.2 and s.3 MHA detention [1]-[2] Care package hours 1:1 by day, 1:3 at night; room constantly monitored [71] Details of restraint Provided for in the care plan but not yet used; locked windows and gates [72]-[73] Details of medication Regular antipsychotic medication, encouraged by staff [73] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Contact with mother highly restricted, partly because of her mother's behaviour [70] Views P's views Consistently wants to go home to live with her mother [68]: 'I'm scared of the staff and I don't want to be here' [20]; 'I can go home and deserve to be with my mum' [23]. Objection was the decisive factor [74] Views of family/carers Her mother's own views are not recorded. TW wants to live with her mother [68]; contact with her mother is highly restricted, partly because of her mother's behaviour [70]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [74] However, as Miss Haines said, this case is finely balanced but really comes down to one consideration - TW's objection to the Placement. [...] In short, TW is experiencing coercion by being forced to live in the Placement when she does not wish to do so. Therefore, whilst to the external observer, this Placement may be very far from the paradigm of confinement in a prison cell, to TW this clearly feels like a prison cell, even if she gets on well with and is compliant to some of the 'warders'. [...] I am satisfied that it does tip over the line into a true deprivation of liberty under Art.5 ECHR, not only because of TW's objection, but on a balance of all relevant factors I have described. Article 8 protections Interference under Article 8 accepted [67]. Alternative Article 8 analysis; no advocate needed because the case continues under s.16 [75]. Urgent authorisation maintained; a standard authorisation is anticipated [75]. Anything else of particular interest Hearing and oral judgment 9 September 2026 [5]; finalised judgment discusses later cases including PK & MK [49], [75]. At the placement since 30 December 2024 [2].
No DoL Salford City Council v AR (Re AR) [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2) On appeal	4 Sep 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Burrows (Manchester)	Not met: protective purpose, relative normality, community participation [68]	Obiter: could not give valid consent [69], [78(c)]	Supported living; 'not a secure establishment' [57]
The case Nature of case Community DoL (pre-dating AGNI) Age of P 25 Mental impairment Moderate to severe learning disability; autism; non-verbal [1], [61(f)] Care arrangements Location of care Supported living; 'not a secure establishment' [57] Care package hours 24-hour 1:1; 2:1 in the community [52] Details of restraint Locked doors and gates, window restrictors, CCTV, physical redirection [52], [54] Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Draft order: staff-supported contact twice monthly at placement; not at family home [3], [8] Views P's views Mixed evidence [53]: positive about the idea of living with his parents and about staying; tries locked exits [53]; garden gate [61(f)] Views of family/carers Parents want more contact, including at home, overnight and unsupervised [5]-[7]; father said AR wanted to 'go home' to visit [7]. Parents accept AR stays at the placement [81] but feel excluded [89]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [68] The decisive features in this case are the protective purpose of the restrictions, the relative normality of the placement, the extent of community participation and the absence of institutional or custodial characteristics. AR is not deprived of his liberty. Article 5 is not engaged. [78] I do not find in AR's case that he would be able to give valid consent if he were deprived of his liberty. Article 8 protections [80] However, in this case, although the Court has no express obligation under the Convention to build a review into the final order, clearly there is a matter left open by the order I propose to make, and AR's rights may still need to be protected by the involvement of the Court ... [91] In this case, I see no reason to order a review. It is not necessary to protect AR's Article 8 rights. Those rights will be protected by the involvement of the LA (with its duties) his family, and his advocate. If before the end of the 12 months it is thought that his rights may be at risk because of there being a dispute over the care plan at that point, then is the time when an application should be made to the Court for the resolution of a dispute. Anything else of particular interest Hearing 26 August 2026
No DoL Derby City Council v SM [2026] EWCOP 46 (T2) On appeal	3 Sep 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Williscroft	Not met: high support; locked doors 'ordinary'; notable autonomy [33], [36], [37]	Parties agreed no valid consent; court accepted; objective element not met [37], [38]	Supported living: single occupancy bungalow [2]
The case Nature of case Community DoL (pre-dating AGNI) Age of P 28 or 29 Mental impairment Severe learning disability, catatonia, major depression, autism [2] Care arrangements Location of care Supported living: single occupancy bungalow [2] Care package hours 2:1 support; hours per week not stated [18], [23] Details of restraint No recorded restraint; distraction and calming [23] Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Visits her mother; social media use supervised [10], [32] Views P's views Often wants to move ('I hate it'), but views 'very changeable' [14], [16]; never refused to return [33] Views of family/carers Her mother said SM 'would never be fully satisfied with where she lived' and had not previously enjoyed sharing accommodation [15]; see also [34]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [38] The ALR and Local Authority agree that SM is not providing valid consent. SM has informed her legal representatives, and myself during a judicial visit, that she does not want to remain in the current placement, that she only wants 1:1 support when going out, that she would like to live with other people and that she does not want to be 'in care'. She has of course also wanted a cat, a dog, a friend to live with, stairs, a swimming pool etc. Her inability to give a reason to move somewhere else is in my view not an expression of permanent preference since the variety of elsewhere she mentions is so variable and this is in response to direct questions about it. Overall, however, both the local authority and ALR accept she is/has not given valid consent and I accept that subjectively there is no evidence she has. [39] The ALR considers that the Local Authority has fallen into error in two ways. First, because, despite acknowledging that the two elements overlap, it has looked at the objective element in isolation. It is right that the care package is in place for SM's own safety and wellbeing, that she has some autonomy with her social interactions, that she accesses the community and that she has links to her family. However, the analysis must not stop there the ALR argues. The effects and manner of implementation are key to determining whether there is confinement and will differ according to whether the person objects to their living arrangements or not. The ALR argues the reality is that SM experiences the arrangements for her residence and care as imposing a major intrusion in her life. That is not the objective conclusion I share. [40] The arrangements do not accord with SM's wishes as she would like to live in an (unavailable) different place but in reality it would appear she welcomes the support she has. [41] The ALR argued the starting point is that SM's views are decisive: they can transform the arrangements for her residence and care into a deprivation of liberty, even if the same conclusion might not be reached for someone in the exact same situation. I cannot accept that is the law or reality since it suggests wishes can change the real lived experience into something different. Looking at the whole situation I note her views as expressed from time to time but also her experience of life of what I conclude is her home rather than a place of confinement in my assessment. Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment. The local authority agreed SM will have a Care Act advocate going forward [6]. Anything else of particular interest Court rejected the ALR's argument that P's views are decisive and can transform the arrangements into a DoL [41]
DoL found Argyll and Bute Council v RF (No 2) [2026] EWCOP 41 (T3)	19 Aug 2026	Tier 3 Theis J (Vice President of the Court of Protection)	Confined: locked doors, supervised at all times, 2:1 in community [76]	Not considered separately; placed against his wishes [76]	'Z placement' in London; type not stated [14]
The case Nature of case Recognition and enforcement under Schedule 3 MCA 2005 Age of P 65 Mental impairment Learning disability and personality disorder [24] Care arrangements Location of care 'Z placement' in London; type not stated [14] Care package hours Supervised at all times; 2:1 in the community [76] Details of restraint Locked doors; guardian may authorise trained physical restraint [25(h)], [76] Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Cannot visit family as he wishes; guardian may deal with mail [25(f)], [76] Views P's views Placed against his wishes; wants to return to Scotland; cannot visit family as he wishes [24], [76] Views of family/carers Wider family supports the local authority's aim of returning him to Scotland [75]. Two siblings live in the area where he grew up [8]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [76] RF is deprived of his liberty in accordance with the multifactorial test outlined in AGNI in that he is confined to the Z placement, the doors are locked, he is supervised at all times, including 2:1 in the community, he is placed in this jurisdiction against his wishes as he wants to return to live in Scotland and is not able to visit his family in accordance with his wishes. Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment. Article 5 safeguards relied on: advocate's monthly visits, a safeguarder, one-year order, liberty to apply for recall [74], [77]-[80]. Anything else of particular interest TBC
No DoL Re Mustafa (a child) [2026] EWHC 2159 (Fam)	12 Aug 2026	High Court (Family Division) Mr Recorder Adrian Jack (sitting as a High Court Judge)	Not decided separately; overall, no deprivation of liberty [14]	His consent or school's common law restraint powers; no validity finding [14], [40]	Specialist residential school, 52 weeks a year [3]
The case Nature of case Child DoL (pre-dating AGNI); inherent jurisdiction Age of P 15 Mental impairment Prader Willi syndrome; developmental delay; additional learning needs [3] Care arrangements Location of care Specialist residential school, 52 weeks a year [3] Care package hours 1:1 at all times; 2:1 as the placement assesses [4] Details of restraint Locked doors; restraint about every 9–10 days (Guardian's estimate) [4], [9] Details of medication Staff administer medicines; no drug names given [4], [5(k)] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) No restriction stated; regular family contact [5(a)] Views P's views LA: 'likes living' there, 'not merely acquiescent' [5(b)], [5(g)]; Guardian's report at [6]: now 'fine' about restraint, previously disliked it Views of family/carers Not stated in the judgment. Regular family contact; Mustafa asked for more overnight stays with his family [5(f)]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [14] When I stand back at look at all the factors relevant to the assessment as to whether there is a deprivation of liberty, in my judgment there is no deprivation of liberty. Mustafa is, as the Guardian sets out at length, generally happy in his placement. Where the school uses physical restraint, it either has Mustafa's consent or it is entitled to use restraint under its common law powers. Either way, there is no deprivation of liberty such as to give rise to a violation of Article 5(1). Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment. Anything else of particular interest Court proceeded on the basis that a child who lacks Gillick competence to consent to confinement can still give valid consent to it, applying AGNI [14]. The Guardian was considering whether to seek permission to appeal [17]. Procedural point: whether the court can make a DoL order of its own motion [15]-[17]; declaratory relief as an alternative remedy [18]. 48 recorded incidents since July 2025 [6]. On a care order; at the school since 2021 [3].
DoL not disputed University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust & Anor v HH [2026] EWCOP 35 (T3)	4 Aug 2026	Tier 3 Theis J (Vice President of the Court of Protection)	Not disputed: no express court finding; the court appeared to accept the agreed position of the Trusts and OS (up to 6:1, restraint) [46], [49]	No finding; Trusts said HH likely objecting [46]	Psychiatric in-patient placement; planned hospital obstetric care [19], [27], [48a]
The case Nature of case Serious medical treatment Age of P 30 Mental impairment Paranoid schizophrenia, acute psychotic episode; detained under s.3 MHA [8] Care arrangements Location of care Psychiatric in-patient placement; planned hospital obstetric care [19], [27], [48a] Care package hours Enhanced 3:1 observations; care plan allows up to 6:1 [20], [46] Details of restraint Physical and chemical restraint as last resort; no prone or supine [48b]-[48d] Details of medication Depot re-commenced; rapid tranquillisation per policy [19], [48d] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) None described; mother to be present at birth if possible [54] Views P's views Trusts submitted, OS agreed, she was likely to object (no court finding) [46], [49]; refused CTG [21]; absconding [20], [25] Views of family/carers Trust consulted the family and agreed HH's mother may be present at the birth if possible [54]. Family's views on the restrictions not otherwise recorded. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [46] In the proposed order the Trusts also provide that to the extent which the care and treatment provided to HH in accordance with the care plan amounts to a deprivation of liberty such deprivation of liberty is authorised in the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction. Miss Richards accepts the multi-factorial approach the court should now take in the light of the decision Re AGNI [2026] UKSC 16. She recognises that the purpose of any restraint would be to support the proposed care plan, that it is likely to be for a relatively short period of time and that her transportation to the hospital could, arguably, be permitted under s 17(3) MHA. However, where the care plan authorises up to 6:1 and provides for both physical and chemical restraint and where it is likely HH would be objecting to those arrangements, in the circumstances of this case, the restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty. Article 8 protections Court noted it 'also needs to consider HH's rights under Articles 3 and 8' [43]; no further analysis. Anything else of particular interest Court does not expressly determine whether there is a DoL but appears to accept the Trusts' position. DoL authorised under the inherent jurisdiction [46]. Transport to hospital arguably permitted under s.17(3) MHA [46]
DoL found Oxfordshire County Council v P & Anor [2026] EWCOP 33 (T2)	24 Jul 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Owens	'Very likely' confined: locked doors, sensors, window restrictors, 1:1 to go out [16], [18]	'Considerable doubt', so no inference of valid consent [18]	Supported living placement, not a secure residential unit [16]
The case Nature of case Community DoL (pre-dating AGNI) Age of P 24 or 25 Mental impairment Learning disability; limited verbal communication; significant childhood trauma [2] Care arrangements Location of care Supported living placement, not a secure residential unit [16] Care package hours 35 hours 1:1 a week; 1:1 for all outings [16] Details of restraint No chemical or physical restraint; environmental measures only [16]-[17] Details of medication No current medication stated; 2017 antidepressants not given [26], [28] Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Supported contact with grandmother; draft plan fortnightly [22]-[25], [41] Views P's views Wishes 'muddled'; says she wants to 'go home' to G; 'predominantly settled and calm'; 'considerable doubt' about consent [18], [19], [39] Views of family/carers Grandmother (G) sought a trial move home. She argued the placement was against P's wishes and coercive, so a DoL, and that at her home there would probably be no DoL [11(c)], [19]. Court found G loves P but struggles to accept professional advice [43], [46]. P has no relationship with her parents [2]. Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [18] Given this doubt and the overlap between the subjective and objective elements of the test, it seems clear to me that it is very likely that P meets the objective element of the test and is confined at her current placement but subjectively there is considerable doubt about whether she is consenting to that. However, as all parties have acknowledged, it is less clear what P's reaction would be to any return to live with G, and thus I am unable to draw a final conclusion about that and what it may mean in relation to the subjective element of the test. As was submitted by Mr Harrison and Ms Fox, should P settle with G she would be likely to be validly consenting to those arrangements and therefore it is probable that she would not be subject to a deprivation of liberty there Article 8 protections Not addressed in the judgment. DoL authorised for 12 months [46]; G's request for further judicial oversight of contact refused [45]; concerns about G acting as rule 1.2 representative [46]. Anything else of particular interest Court indicated that, if P settled with G, she would be likely to be validly consenting, so probably not deprived of liberty there [18]

Other UK jurisdictions

Reported decisions from Northern Ireland and Scotland applying AGNI. They are persuasive only in England and Wales and are not counted in the figures above.

Case	Date	Court	Objective element	Valid consent	Setting	Details
No DoL A Health and Social Care Trust v WM & Ors [2026] NIFam 23	21 Oct 2026	High Court (Northern Ireland) Humphreys J	Restrictions on liberty, not a deprivation [50]: supervision substantial but responsive to need rather than constant; kitchen lock affects one part of the home; restraint exceptional; attends school and youth club; far removed from the paradigm of a prison cell [49]–[50]. No party disputed this [54]	Not decided: unnecessary and undesirable to determine [51]. The Trust could not have consented had he been confined (J v BANES good law) [53]	Two-bedroom residential property owned and managed by the Trust, after secure accommodation [1], [5]
The case Nature of case Child DoL (inherent jurisdiction, Northern Ireland); child under a full care order Age of P 13 Mental impairment Autism spectrum disorder, global developmental delay, moderate to severe learning disability; history of violence [5] Care arrangements Location of care Two-bedroom residential property owned and managed by the Trust, after secure accommodation [1], [5] Care package hours Usually 1:1, at times 2:1 [6] Details of restraint Physical restraint as a last resort; used once, in April 2026 [2], [6], [49] Details of medication Not stated in the judgment Contact restrictions (internet, social media, real life) Kitchen locked as necessary [2], [6]. No other activities prevented [49] Views P's views Appears generally content and regards the placement as his home [49], [50] Views of family/carers Mother (WM) represented and engaged; father (KR) has parental responsibility but chose not to take part [3]. No party disputed that there was no DoL [54] Reasoning Key quotes / summary of reasoning [50] Considering these factors cumulatively, I am satisfied that they amount to restrictions upon LR's liberty but not a deprivation of it. The degree of supervision is substantial but responsive to need, rather than being constant. The environmental restriction relates to one part of the home. Physical restraint is an exceptional feature of his care. LR participates in education and community activities and he generally regards the placement as his home and is content to remain there. The purpose and practical effect of the arrangements are to enable LR to live safely in the community rather than to confine him. The arrangements remain far removed in degree and intensity from the paradigm of the prison cell identified in AGNI. [55] ... One must question whether the protection afforded by the other relevant Convention rights is real or illusory. There is no equivalence between the regular supervision of the court and the steps required to enforce such rights. ... [60] In doing so, I emphasise that the factual conclusion reached in this case should not be treated as establishing that materially similar restrictions will necessarily fall outside article 5. The ratio of AGNI requires a case-specific assessment of the particular individual's circumstances and the nature, duration, manner and effect of the measures in question. Such scrutiny is important to ensure that vulnerable adults and children do not unjustifiably lose the protection which the law otherwise affords them. Article 8 protections Questions whether the Article 2, 3 and 8 protection relied on in AGNI is 'real or illusory'; LAC reviews are an important safeguard but not equivalent to independent judicial oversight [55]–[57] Anything else of particular interest Northern Ireland decision: persuasive only in England and Wales. Reviews the England and Wales cases and notes judges 'can and will reach different decisions in very similar cases' (contrasting BM and ST) [39]. AGNI principles apply to children under 16 [48]. Interim order discharged; application dismissed [59].

Unreported decisions

Decisions we know about from blog reports of hearings or from practitioners, where there may be no published judgment.

Case	Date	Court	Source	Summary
DoL found BW (COP 20013994)	27 Oct 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Hilder (First Avenue House)	Open Justice CoP blog (Celia Kitzinger, 28 Oct 2026)	Contested. Young woman with autism, low adaptive functioning, situational mutism and trauma, in a self-contained supported-living flat (s.117 aftercare), with a tracking device, a curfew, outings with two carers on two days a week, and Clare's Law checks on sexual partners. LA argued no DoL; OS (Victoria Butler-Cole KC) argued DoL. Judge found a DoL: 'not a marginal situation ... the very exemplar of why the state is under an obligation to provide safeguards'. Authorised until the next hearing; review April 2027.
Details P's views Objects loudly and often: says she has 'capacity in everything', wants 'the DOL' removed, calls staff 'jailors' and her flat a 'prison'. Views of family/carers Not stated in the blog. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest Judge noted court oversight would be the same with or without the DoL label. Judge said she was told Re AR and Re SM are 'subject to appeal'. Written judgment expected? No (judge's last sitting day)
DoL found COP 13851951 (NHS Mid and South Essex ICB)	2 Oct 2026	Tier 1 District Judge Callaghan (Chelmsford)	Open Justice CoP blog (Celia Kitzinger, 12 Oct 2026)	Contested. Man in his early 20s with severe autism and learning disability in supported living (1:1 at home, 2:1 out; PBS plan permits restraint as a last resort). ICB argued no DoL because he 'manifests acceptance' and is happy. OS and mother argued DoL. Judge found DoL and no valid consent, treating an incident when he was refused an evening outing (he bit a co-resident) as 'clear evidence of a deprivation of liberty', alongside locked doors, constant supervision, no independent community access, restraint and contact restrictions. DoL approved as necessary and proportionate.
Details P's views Distressed when prevented from going out after 8pm; otherwise described by the ICB and his father as happy and 'flourishing'. Views of family/carers Mother: DoL; the evening restrictions are unnecessary and harmful. Father: restrictions are for his safety, 'it doesn't mean they are holding him prisoner'. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest Blogger contrasts the outcome with Re AR [2026] EWCOP 45 on similar facts. Mother's contact is regulated by a Schedule of Agreement that replaced an injunction. DHSC interim guidance (15 Jun 2026) on objection was relied on. Written judgment expected? Unlikely (ex tempore)
Not decided COP 14053038 (LB Harrow)	2 Oct 2026	Tier 1 District Judge (Tribunal Judge) Reeder	Open Justice CoP blog (Maria Maier, 6 Oct 2026)	Young man living at home with his family, attending a day centre with 2:1 staff. Family physically restrains him and he takes three sedative medications, neither of which is in the care plan. The judge declined to decide the AGNI question on the evidence available; the existing authorisation continues.
Details P's views Not stated in the blog. Views of family/carers Brother (financial deputy) wants P to move closer to him and asked for an independent social worker. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest OS counsel: local authorities are 'attempting to conclude proceedings in inappropriate circumstances'. Written judgment expected? No (not decided)
No DoL COP 13040188 (restricted patient)	6 Jul 2026	Tier 2 Senior Judge Hilder	Open Justice CoP blog (Gill Loomes-Quinn, 2 Aug 2026)	All parties agreed there was no DoL after AGNI for a man in his 60s with a moderate learning disability living alone in an ordinary bungalow, with no locked doors, restraint, seclusion or sedation. Senior Judge Hilder accepted the broad thrust of the LA's submission. Because he is a restricted patient on conditional discharge (ss.37/41 MHA), and the Tribunal had relied on the COPDOL order, the judge ordered that the Secretary of State and Responsible Clinician be invited to make written submissions by 3 Aug 2026 before she terminates proceedings on the papers. Final order not known.
Details P's views Described as happy. Views of family/carers Sister says he is happy and settled. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest Raises how AGNI affects restricted patients whose conditional discharge conditions were framed around an authorised DoL. Written judgment expected? Not known
DoL found COP 20018413 ('Ms Smith')	1 Jul 2026	Tier 1 District Judge Glassbrook	Open Justice CoP blog (Celia Kitzinger, 9 Aug 2026)	s.21A challenge. Woman in her fifties with strokes and acquired brain injury in a 24-hour supported placement. Court found she has capacity for residence and care, so the standard authorisation was terminated. The order (20 Jul 2026) declares the authorisation invalid and the DoL unlawful from the date she had capacity (no later than the expert's assessment, report dated 21 Jan 2026). In the hearing, the judge concluded the arrangements remained a DoL after AGNI, relying heavily on her objection; this is not recorded in the order.
Details P's views Describes the placement as 'like prison'; feels she has 'lost years of her life to institutional care'. Views of family/carers Not stated in the blog. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest Relevant to retrospective damages claims after AGNI. Litigation capacity and subject-matter capacity: Re P [2021] EWCOP 27 [33] applied. Written judgment expected? Not known
Not decided COP 20026819	1 Jul 2026	Tier 1 District Judge Glassbrook	Open Justice CoP blog (Celia Kitzinger, 17 Jul 2026)	s.21A challenge. Man in his seventies with dementia in a care home under a standard authorisation; prescribed risperidone. LA suggested he may no longer be deprived of liberty after AGNI. Judge's provisional view was that there is still a DoL: 'The Supreme Court said that if there are objections then, on the face of it, we've got deprivation of liberty.' Not finally decided; further hearing later in 2026.
Details P's views Objects: feels restricted; not going out 'wears me down'; wants to relocate. Has not left the home since Christmas. Views of family/carers Not stated (placement chosen to be near his son). Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest A condition on the standard authorisation (community access with a log) had not been complied with. The judge suggested that this could make the DoL unlawful, citing AJ v A Local Authority [2015] EWCOP 5. Written judgment expected? No (not finally decided)
No DoL COP 13189539	30 Jun 2026	Tier 2 HHJ Burrows (Preston)	Open Justice CoP blog (Celia Kitzinger, 5 Jul 2026)	Woman in her 20s with severe learning disability, refractory epilepsy and scoliosis, living in an annex to the family home with 2:1 day care, waking night care and CCTV; parents provide about 85 hours a week. OS submitted no DoL because she 'doesn't have any liberty to be deprived of'. Judge provisionally found no valid consent, but held there was no DoL applying the AGNI comparator, while calling the 'incapable of liberty' argument 'deeply philosophically difficult'.
Details P's views Parents say she can 'vocalise happiness' with her care. Not otherwise known. Views of family/carers Parents agreed there was no DoL: she is 'cared for, not confined'. They want to move to directly employed carers. Article 8 protections Judge: 'Privacy is hugely interfered with - it is necessary and proportionate ... but it does engage Article 8'. CCTV in use held 'reasonable and necessary within the terms of Article 8'. Raised the need for at least one review; blogger thinks a review was ordered (order not seen). Anything else of particular interest No comprehensive care plan after two years of proceedings. Bathroom camera disconnected. Personal injury funds at risk of running out. Written judgment expected? Not known
DoL found COP 20035691 (Barts Health NHS Trust)	22 Jun 2026	TBC Ms Powell KC	Open Justice CoP blog (Celia Kitzinger, 1 Jul 2026)	Serious medical treatment. Man in his forties with autoimmune encephalitis in hospital, resisting treatment. Court authorised plasma exchange and immunoglobulin under general anaesthetic or sedation, with restraint, and authorised a DoL as 'necessary and proportionate', adopting the Trust's written submission that restraint and sedation are coercive 'as it is likely that he will not remain in hospital without them', 'using a multi-factorial approach'. No further reasoning given in the oral judgment.
Details P's views Resists treatment, removes cannulas; believes there is nothing wrong with him. Views of family/carers No family or friends involved; an IMCA supported the plan. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest The blogger describes this as the first post-AGNI court authorisation of a DoL she had observed. Blog notes AGNI [145] (ordinary hospital treatment not usually a DoL) was not addressed. Hearing in public; Gardner case summary provided, position statements not. Written judgment expected? No (oral judgment)
DoL found COP 13665011 (RB Kingston)	TBC	Tier 1 District Judge Clarke	Open Justice CoP blog (Maria Maier, 21 Aug 2026)	s.21A challenge. Man in a care home after a brain injury: locked doors, almost always supervised, hourly checks, lorazepam. Court found a DoL; sedative medication undermined any apparent compliance as valid consent. Proceedings concluded with a condition about covert medication; the LA to consider the AGNI factors on review.
Details P's views Wants to return home. Views of family/carers Wife: he is 'in the best place'; family content for proceedings to end; wanted a safeguard on covert medication. Article 8 protections Not mentioned in the blog. Anything else of particular interest Compliance under sedation is not consent. Written judgment expected? Not known

These summaries are for information only and are not legal advice.